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778 SEE V. SEE [64C.2d 
[L. A. No. 27754. In Bank. July 1, 1966.] 
LAURANCE A. SEE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ELIZA-
BETH LEE SEE, Defendant and Appellant. 
[1] Divorce-Findings-Cruelty.-!..The trial court did not err in 
finding that a husband's actions constituted extreme cruelty 
where the finding was made on consideration of all the circum-
stances in light of the intelligence, refinement, and delicacy of 
sentiment of the complaining party and was supported by 
substantial evidence. 
[2] Id.-Grounds-Cruelty-Corroboration of Successive Acts.-In 
a divorce action, when repeated instances of offensive conduct 






Id.-Grounds-Cruelty-Corroboration.-Determination of the 
sufficiency of evidence corroborating cruelty is within the trial 
court's sound discretion. • 
Id.-Alimony-Where Divorce Granted to Both Parties.-The 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding alimony to 
a wife where both parties were granted a divorce; alimony may 
be granted to either party, even though a divorce is granted to 
both. 
Husband' and Wife-Properly-Community and Separate-
'l'ime of Acquisition as Test.-The character of property as 
separate or community is determined when acquired. 
Id.-Transactions Inter Se-Changing Character of Properly 
by Agreement.-Property that is community when acquired 
remains so throughout the marriage unless the spouses agree to 
change its nature or the spouse charged with its management 
makes a gift of it to the other. . 
[7] Id.-Properly-Determination of Character - Pr:esumptions: 
Burden of Proof.-Property acquired by purchase during 
[7] See Cal.Jur.2d, Community Property, § 41; Am.Jur.2d, Com-
munity Property, § 49. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Divorce, § 111; [2] Divorce, § 21; 
[3] Divorce, § 26(1); [4] Divorce, § 198(1) (f); [5] Husband and 
Wife, § 36; [6] Husband and Wife, § 159; [7] Husband and Wife, 
§§ 69, 77; [8] Husband and Wife, § 54; [9, 10] Husband and 
Wife, § 90(3); [11] Husband and Wife, § 55; Divorce, § 221; [12, 
22] Husband and Wife, § 69 (6); [13] Husband and Wife, § 53; 
[14] Husband and Wife, §§ 120, 125; [15] Husband and Wife, 
§§ 120, 125, 130; [16, 19, 20] Husband and Wife, § 130; [17] 
Husband and Wife, § 73; [18] Husband and Wife, §§ 100, 130; 
[21] Divorce, § 221. 
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marriage is presumed to be community, and the burden is on 
the spouse asserting its separate character to overcome the 
presumption. 
[8] Id.-Property-Commingling.~The presumption that property 
acquired by purchase during marriage is community applies 
when the husband purchases property during the marriage 
with funds from an undisclosed or disputed source, such as an 
account or funds in which he has commingled his separate 
funds with community funds. 
[9] ld.-Property - Determination of Character - Evidence-
Commingled Property.-A husband may trace the source of 
property to his separate funds and overcome the presumption 
that property acquired during marriage is community with evi-
dence that community expenses exceeded community income at 
the time of acquisition. Where he proves that, at the time, all 
community income was exhausted by family expenses, he estab-
lishes the property was purchased with separate funds. 
[10] ld.-Property-Character-Evidence-Commingled Property 
-Only when, through no fault of the husband, it is not 
possible to ascertain the balance of income and expenditures at 
the time the property was acquired, can recapitulation of the 
total community expenses and income throughout the marriage 
be used to establish the character of property acquired during 
the marriage. (Disapproving anything to the contrary in Pat-
terson v. Patterson, 242 Cal.App.2d -- [51 Cal.Rptr. 339].) 
[11] ld.-Property - Commingling - Tracing Funds: Divorce-
Disposition of Property-Determination of Character.-A hus-
band who commingles comlllunity with separate property, but 
fails to keep adequate records, cannot, at the termination of 
the marriage, invoke the burden of record keeping as a justifi-
cation to recapitulate income and expenses and disregard 
acquisitions that may have been made during the marriage 
with community funds. 
[12] ld.-Property-Character-Presumptions.-When funds used 
to acquire property during marriage cannot otherwise be traced 
to their source and the husband who commingled property is 
unable to establish a deficit in the communitY accounts at the 
time of acquisition, the presumption controls that propert.y 
acquired by purchase during marriage is community. 
[13] ld.-Property-Commingling.-A husband may protect his 
separate property by not commingling community and separate 
assets and income. Once he commingles, he assumes the burden 
of keeping records adequate to establish the balance of 
community income and expenditures when an asset is acquired 
with commingled property. 
[14] ld.·-Liability - For Wife's Support: Wife's LiabilitY.-A 
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these obligations are not conditioned on the existence of 
community property or income. 
[15] ld.-Liability for Wife's Support: Wife's Liability: Reim-
bursement for Advances.-The duty to support imposed on 
husbands by Civ. Code, § 155, and on wives by § 176, requires 
the use of their separate property when there is no community 
property, and there is no statutory right to reimbursement. 
[16] ld.-Liability - Reimbursement for Advances.-A husband 
who elects to use his separate property instead of community 
property to meet community expenses cannot claim reimburse-
ment. 
[17] ld.-Property-Character-Presumption of Gift.-Absent a 
contrary agreement, the husband's use of separate property for 
community purposes is a gift to the community. 
[18] Id.-Proper1y-Management and Control: Liability - Reim-
bursement for Advances.-A husband has both management 
and contrQI of community property (Civ. Code, §§ 172, 172a) 
with the right to select the place and mode of living (§ 156), 
and his use of separate property to maintain a standard of 
living that cannot be maintained with cOllllllunity resources 
alone no more entitles him to reimbursement from after-
acquired community assets than it would from existing 
community assets. 
[19] Id. - Liability - Reimbursement for Advances. - A husband 
has no right to reimbursement of separate funds expended for 
community purposes when the community bank account is 
exhausted. 
[20] Id.-Liability-Reimbursement for Advances.-A party using 
separate property for community purposes is entitled' to reim-
bursement from the community or separate property of the 
other only where there is an agreement between the parties to 
that effect. (Disapproving, to the extent of conflict with this 
rule, Mears v. Mears, 180 Cal.App.2d 484 [4 Cal.Rptr. 618]; 
Kenney v. Kenney, 128 Cal.App.2d 128 [274 P.2d 951]; 
Thomasset v. Thomasset, 122 Cal.App.2d 116 [264 P.2d 626]; 
Hill v. Hill, 82 Cal.App.2d 682 [187 P.2d 28].) 
[21] Divorce-Disposition of Property-Determination of Charac-
ter.-A husband's interest in profit-sharing trusts of two 
corporations was unquestionably a community asset where his 
interest arose by virtue of his employment and was irrevocable 
at the time of his divorce. . 
[22] Husband and Wife-Property-Character-Presumptions.-
In a divorce action, where the property issues were improperly 
[16] See Cal.Jur.2d, Husband and Wife, § 20; Am.Jur., Hus-
band and Wife (1st ed § 110). 
[21] See Cal.Jur.2d, Divorce aIHl Separation, § 291. 
J 
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tried on the theory that the nature of the property could be 
determined by proving total community expenditures exceeded 
total community income and it was possible the parties might 
have additional evidence that would otherwise have been 
presented, plaintiff's failure to overcome the presumption that 
the assets acquired during marriage were community property 
was not conclusive. 
APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Frederick W. Mahl, Jr., ,Judge. Reversed 
in part and affirmetl in part. 
Action· and cross-action for divorce. Judgment granting 
divorce to each party reversed as to that portion of jUdgment 
determining there was no community.property and awarding 
alimony to wife, and in all other respects affirmed. 
Crowley & Goffin, Arthur J. Crowley and Ron Swearinger 
for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
Stanley N. Gleis for Defendant and Appellant. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Plaintiff Laurance A. See and cross-
complainant Elizabeth Lee See appeal from an interlocutory 
judgment that grants each a divorce. Laurance attacks the 
finding tl.iat he was guilty of extreme cruelty, the granting of 
a divorce to Elizabeth, and the award to her of permanent 
alimony of $5,400 per month. Elizabeth attacks the finding 
that 'there was no community property at the time of the 
divorce. Neither party contests the provisions regarding 
custody and support of the three minor children. 
The parties were married on October 17, 1941, and they 
separated about May 10, 1962. Throughout the marriage they 
were residents of California, and Laurance was employed by a 
family-controlled corporation, See's Candies, Inc. For most of 
that period he also served as president of its wholly-owned 
subsidiary, See's Candy Shops, Inc. In the twenty-one years 
of the marriage he received more than $1,000,000 in salaries 
from the two corporations. 
[1] . The trial court did not err in finding that plaintiff's 
actions constituted extreme cruelty. That finding was made 
upon consideration of all the circumstances of the case in light 
of the" intelligence, refinement, and delicacy of sentiment of 
the complaining party" (Nunes v. Nunes, 62 Ca1.2d 33,36 [41 
Cal.Rptr. 5, 396 P.2d 37J) and is supported by substantial 
, 
ji 
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evidence. [2] When repeated instances of offensive conduct 
are offered to establish cruelty, it is not necessary that each be 
corroborated. [3] The determination of the sufficiency of 
corroborating evidence is within the sound discretion of the 
trial court. (Id. (.\t p. 37.) 
[4] Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding 
alimony to Elizabeth. Alimony may be awarded to either party 
even though a divorce is granted to both. (Mueller v. Mueller, 
44 Ca1.2d 527, 530 [282 P.2d 869] ; DeBurgh v. DcBurgh, 39 
Ca1.2d 858, 874 [250 P.2d 598].) We do not reach plaintiff's 
contention that the alimony award was excessive. Since that 
part of the judgment must be reversed for reasons that appear 
hereafter, the considerations that prompted the amount of the 
award may no longer be relevant. 
Laurance had a personal account on the books of See's 
Candies, Inc:, denominated Account 13. Throughout the 
marriage his annual salary from See's Candies, Inc., which 
was $60,000 at thc time of the divorce, was credited to this 
account and many family expenses were paid by checks drawn 
on it. To maintain a credit balance in Account 13, Laurance 
from time to time transferred funds to it from an account at 
the Security First National Bank, hereafter called the Secur-
ity Account. 
The funds deposited in the Security Account came 
primarily from Laurance's separate property. On occasion he 
deposited his annual $15,000 salary from See's Candy Shops, 
Inc. in that account as a "reserve against taxes" on that 
salary. Thus there was a commingling of community property 
and separate property in both the Security Account and 
Account 13. Funds from the Security Account were sometimes 
used to pay community expenses and also to purchase some of 
the assets held in Laurance's name at the time of the divorce 
proceedings. 
Over Elizabeth's objection, the trial court followed a theory 
advanced by Laurance that a proven excess of community 
expenses over community income during the marriage estab-
lishes that there has been no acquisition of property with 
community funds. 
Such a theory, without support in either statutory or case 
law of this state, would disrupt the California community 
property system. It would transform a wife's interest in the 
community property from a "present, existing and equal 
interest" as specified by Civil Code section 161a, into an 
inchoate expectancy to be realized only if upon termination of 
) 
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the marriage the community income fortuitously exceeded 
community expenditures. It would engender uncertainties as 
to testamentary and inter vivos dispositions, income, estate 
and gift taxation, and claims against property. 
[5] The character of property as separate or-community is 
determined at the time of its acquisition. (In "e Miller, 31 
Cal.2d 191, 197 [187 P.2d 722] ; Siberell v. Siberell, 214 Cal. 
767, 770 [7 P.2d 1003]; Bias v. Reed, 169 Cal. 33, 42 [145 P. 
516]. [6] If it is community property when acquired, it re-
mains so throughout the marriage unless the spouses agree to 
change its nature or the spouse charged with its management 
makes a gift of it to the other. (Odone v. Marzocchi, 34 Cal.2d 
431, 435 [211 P.2d 297, 212 P.2d 233, 17 A.L.R.2d 1109]; 
Mears v. Mears, 180 Cal.App.2d 484, 499 [4 Cal.Rptr. 618].) 
[7] Property acquired by purchase during a marriage is 
presumed to be community property, and the burden is on the 
spouse asserting its separate character to overcome the 
presumption. (Estate of NiccoUs, 164 Cal. 368 [129 P. 278] ; 
TAomasset v. Thomasset, 122 Cal.App.2d 116, 123 [264 P.2d 
626]. [8] The presumption applies when a husband pur-
chases property during the marriage with funds from an un-
disclosed or disputed source, such as an account or fund in 
which he has commingled his separate funds with community 
funds. (Estate of Neilson, 57 Ca1.2d 733,742 [22 Cal.Rptr. 1, 
371 P.2d 745]. [9] He may trace the source of the property 
to his separate funds and overcome the presumption with 
evidence that community expenses exceeded community in-
come at the time of acquisition. If he proves that at that time 
all community income was exhausted by family expenses, he 
establishes that the property was purchased with separate 
funds. (Estate of Neilson, supra, at p. 742; Thomasset v. 
Thomasett, supra, at p. 127.) [10] Only when, through no 
fault of the husband, it is not possible to ascertain the 
balance of income and expenditures at the time property 
was acquired, can recapitulation of the total community ex-
penses and income throughout the marriage be used to 
establish the character of the property. Thus, in Estate of 
Ades, 81 Ca1.App.2d 334 [184 P.2d 1], relied on by plain-
tift, this method of tracing was used to establish that assets 
discovered after the husband's death had been acquired before 
. the marriage. The question was not presented as to the balance 
of income and expenditures at any specific time during the 
marriage. In Estate of Arstein, 56 Ca1.2d 239 [14 Cal.Rptr. 
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and industry in managing his separate property was the 
source of all community income during the marriage. Not until 
the trial could a determination be made as to what proportion 
of the total income was attributable to the husband's skill and 
industry. In Thomasset v. Thomasset, supra, 122 Cal.App.2d 
116, the court made clear that the time of acquisition of 
disputed property is decisive. " An accountant testified that at 
the time the various items adjudged to be defendant's 
separate property were purchased, there were no community 
funds available .... The evidence [shows] ... that at the 
time the property was purchased the community funds had 
been exhausted .... " (ld. at p. 127.) Anything to the 
contrary in Patterson v. Patterson, 242 Cal.App.2d -- [51 
Cal.Rptr. 339], is disapproved. 
[11] A husband who commingles the property of the com-
munity with his separate property, but fails to keep adequate 
records cannot invoke the burden of record keeping as a 
justification for a recapitulation of income and expenses at the 
termination of the marriage that disregards any acquisitions 
that may have been made during the marriage with community 
funds. [12] If funds used for acquisitions during marriage 
cannot otherwise be traced to their source and the husband 
who has commIngled property is unable to establish that there 
was a deficit in the community accounts when the assets were 
purchased, the .presumption controls that property acquired by 
purchase during marriage is community property. [13] The 
husband may protect his separate property by not commingling 
community and separate assets and income. Once he com-
mingles, he assumes the burden of keeping records adequate to 
establish the balance of community income and expenditures 
at the time an asset is acquired with commingled property. 
The trial court also followed the theory that a husband who 
expends his separate property for community expenses is 
entitled to reimbursement from community assets. This theory 
likewise lacks support in the statutory or case law of this 
state. A husband is required to support his wife and family. 
(Civ. Code, §§ 155, 196, 242). [14] Indeed, husband and 
wife assume mutual obligations of support upon marriage. 
'rhese obligations are not conditioned on the existence of com-
munity property or income. [15] The duty to support im-
posed upon husbands by Civil Code section 155 and upon 
wives by Civil Code section 176 requires the use of separate 
property of the parties when there is no community property. 
There is no right to reimbursement under the statutes. 
) 
July 1966] SEE V. SEE 785 
[84 C.2d 778; III CaLRptr. 888. 415 P.2d 778) 
[16] Likewise a husband who elects to use his separate 
property instead of community property to meet community 
expenses cannot claim reimbursement. [17] In the absence of 
an agreement to the contrary, the use of his separate property 
by a husband for community purposes is a gift to the com-
munity. The considerations that underlie the rule denying 
reimbursement to either the community or the husband's sepa-
rate estate for funds expended to improve a wife's separate 
property (Dunn v. Mullan, 211 Cal. 583, 589 [296 P. 604, 77 
A.L.R. 1015]) apply with equal force here. [18] The hus-
band has both management and control of the community 
property (Civ. Code, §§ 172, 172a) along with the right to 
select the place and mode of living. (Civ. Code, § 156.) His use 
of separate property to maintain a standard of living that can-
not be maintained with community resources alone no more 
entitles him to reimbursement from after-acquired community 
assets than it would from existing community assets. 
[19] Nor can we approve the recognition of an exception, a 
right to reimbursement of separate funds expended for com-
munity purposes at a time when a community bank account is 
pxhausted. (Kenney v. Kenney, 128 Cal.App.2d 128, 136 [274 
P.2d 951]; Thomasset v. Thomasett, supra, 122 Cal.App.2d 
116, 126; HI?,l v. Hill, 82 Cal.App.2d 682, 698 [187 P.2d 28] ; 
cf. Mears v. Mears, supra, 180 Cal.App.2d 484,508.) Although 
this exception was restricted to recovery from the same 
community account when replenished, there is no statutory 
basis for it, and the court that first declared it cited no author-
ity to support it. Such an exception conflicts with the long-
standing rule that a wife who uses her separate funds in 
payment of family expenses without agreement regarding 
repayment cannot require her husband to reimburse her. (lves 
v. Oonnacher, 162 Cal. 174, 177 [121 P. 394] ; Blackburn v . 
. Blackburn, 160 Cal.App.2d 301, 304 [324 P.2d 971] ; Thomson 
v. Thomson, 81 Cal.App. 678 [254 P. 644]; cf. Haseltine v. 
Haseltine, 203 Cal.App.2d 48 [21 Cal.Rptr. 238].) Nor is a 
wife required to reimburse her husband in the converse situ-
ation, particularly since the husband has the control and 
management of community expenses and resources. [20] The 
basic rule is that the party who uses his separate property for 
community purposes is entitled to reimbursement from tht' 
. community or separate property of the other only if there is 
an agreement between the parties to that effect. To the extent 
that they conflict with this rule Mears v. Mears, supra, 180 
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128; Thomasset v. Thomasset, supra, 122 CalApp.2d 116; and 
Hill v. Hill, 82 Cal.App.2d 682 [187 P.2d 28], are dis-
approved. 
Elizabeth makes several additional assignments of error 
relative to specific assets in existence on the dissolution of the 
marriage but not found to be community property. [21] The 
record does not afford a basis for determining the nature of 
these assets, with the exception of Laurance's interest in the 
profit-sharing trusts of the two See corporations. His interest 
in these funds arose by virtue of his employment and was 
irrevocable at the time of the divorce. It was therefore unques-
tionably a community property asset. 
Plaintiff has not met his burden of proving an excess of 
community expenses over community income at the times the 
other assets purchased during the marriage were acquired. The 
part of the judgment finding them to be his separate property 
is therefore reversed. [22] Since the property issues were 
tried on the theory that the nature of the property could be 
determined by proving total community income and expendi-
tures and since the parties may have additional evidence that 
.Jvould otherwise have been presented, plaintiff's failure to 
overcome the presumption that the assets are community prop-
erty is not conclusive. We therefore remand the case for retrial 
of the property issues. Since the court considered the lack of 
community property a significant factor in determining the 
amount of the alimony award, that part of the judgment is 
also reversed. 
The judgment is affirmed in all other respects. Elizabeth 
shall recover her costs on both appeals. 
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., Mosk, J., and 
Burke, J., concurred. . 
